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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JEANNE ALEXINE JENKINS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN ALLEN JENKINS and VER-
ONICA JENKINS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
8276 
Since we do not entirely concur in appellants' state-
ment of the facts, we shall restate them as concisely as is 
consistent with our desire to give the court a complete view 
of the issues and of the questions involved for determina-
tion. For purposes of convenience, respondent shall be re-
ferred to as plaintiff and appellants referred to as defen-
dants. Unless otherwise indicated, we shall refer only to 
the defendant, John Allen Jenkins, since, as indicated in 
defendants' brief (Pg. 1), the defendant, Veronica Jenkins, 
is only a nominal party. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff -and defendant were formerly residents of 
San Diego County, California. While residing there, they 
ran into matrimonial difficulties and plaintiff filed a com-
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2 
plaint in the Superior Court of the State of California in 
and for the County of San Diego, (hereinafter referred to 
as the California court) seeking a divorce from the defen-
dant and the custody of their two minor children involved 
in this action, to-wit: Theodore Scott Jenkins and Mia 
Jenkins. Defendant duly filed his voluntary appearance 
therein and waived further notice of the proceedings (TR. 
4). Pursuant to the complaint of the plaintiff, an inter-
locutory decree of divorce was entered on the 9th day of 
March, 1953, granting to plaintiff a divorce and custody 
of said two minor children ( TR. 4) . Shortly thereafter, 
plaintiff, by reason of a physical injury, requested the 
defendant to take care of the children pending her recovery 
and on or about the 5th day of May, 1953, defendant did 
in fact take said two children. Thereafter, plaintiff re-
covered from her injuries and requested defendant to re-
turn the children to her. On or about March 20, 1954, de-
fendant advised plaintiff that he had remarried and had 
no intention of surrendering custody of said two minor 
children. Whereupon, plaintiff instigated the present pro-
ceedings in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, by filing her complaint for a writ of habeas corpus 
(TR. 1-3). Pursuant to the prayer of the complaint, a writ 
of habeas corpus was issued commanding the defendant 
to appear before the court and to bring with him said 
minor children (TR. 7). The hearing on the writ of habeas 
corpus came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Judge Lewis Jones on the 22nd day of June, 1954, at which 
time the court made the following statement: 
"THE COURT: Gentlemen, the Clerk sent me 
the files and I've read the pleadings. I think I'll 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
require a statement of the theory of the parties, in 
the nature of a pretrial, before we commence, be-
cause this may or may not be able to be settled. I 
don't mean ultimately settled, but the matter of why 
the parties are here rather than down in the Super-
ior Court of San Diego County is a very pressing 
thing to the court. Irregardless of Cook vs. Cook 
and other cases, I'd like to discuss the law before 
we take any evidence. I don't mean by that that we 
can settle the matter, but we might hurdle some-
thing" (TR. 21). 
Pages 21 through 45 of the record on appeal discloses 
what transpired between counsel and the court pursuant 
to the foregoing suggestion and was termed by the court 
as pre-trial statements and oral stipulation of counsel (TR. 
16). Pursuant to the discussions between court and counsel, 
the parties entered into a stipulation which was summarized 
by the court as follows: 
"THE COURT: Then to see if I can summarize 
this, the parties appear and make a pretrial state-
ment and stipulate the matter may be continued, the 
court to retain jurisdiction of the children until 
such time as an order is obtained by either party. 
That is, a ne~v order from the Superior Court of San 
Diego. That order could be either an order denying 
a petition to modify or granting a petition. And at 
that time, upon being advised of the action of the 
Superior Court of San Diego County, this court will 
then make its written order directing-or granting 
the writ if you prevail down in San Diego, and de-
nying the writ if you prevail, Mr. Gustin. Is that 
the understanding now, so that the parties won't 
have to come back?" (TR. 44). (Italics added.) 
Pursuant to said stipulation, the defendant filed a pe-
tition in the California court asking that court to modify the 
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original divorce decree and to grant to him the custody of 
said minor children. Both parties entered their appearance 
in said cause and were. duly represented by counsel. On 
Sept~mber 22, 1954, after a full hearing, said California 
court made and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order denying defendant's petition to modify 
said final decree of divorce and ordering the defendant to 
immediately return said children to the plaintiff on the 
grounds and for the reasons: "That Theodore Scott Jen-
kins and Mia Jenkins are of young and tender years, being 
approximately six and four years of age respectively; that 
it is for the best interests of said minor children that they 
be in the care, custody and control of their natural mother, 
the plaintiff, Jeanne Alexine Jenkins", and "That there 
has not been any change of circumstances sufficient to war-
rant a· modification of the interlocutory and final decree of 
divorce with respect to the care, custody and control of said 
two minor children." (Pl. ex. 4, Pages 3 and 4.) Said 
California court also found as a 1natter of fact: "That the 
plaintiff Jeanne Alexine Jenkins has recovered from any 
physical or mental disabilities which may have existed dur-
ing the period from February, 1953, to July, 1953; that 
said disabilities are not likely to reoccur; that the plaintiff 
is a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and 
control of the minor children, Theodore Scott Jenkins and 
Mia Jenkins (PI. Ex. 4, Page 3) . 
Thereafter, defendant filed a notice of appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the State of California, which appeal is 
now pending. On October 7, 1954, in accordance with the 
stipulation entered into by the parties, plaintiff filed and 
served a motion requesting the District Court of Salt Lake 
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County to enter its order granting the writ of habeas cor-
pus basing said motion upon the order of the California 
court ( TR. 17-20) . Said motion came on for hearing on 
the 14th day of October, 1954, before the Honorable Lewis 
Jones, who presided over the hearing on June 22, 1954. 
Pages 57 to 85 of the record on appeal discloses what 
transpired between counsel and the court at that time. De-
fendant' s counsel during the course of the discussion and 
in referring to the stipulation entered into by and between 
the parties on June 22, 1954, made the following statement: 
"This stipulation is a matter that is between Your Honor 
and myself. Your Honor's conclusion as to what was stip-
ulated to is, of course,. the last word so far as I am con-
cerned and so far as my clients are concerned. I don't in-
tend to let anybody else interpret or review the stipulation 
that was made between counsel and the court" (TR. 58). 
Thereafter, plaintiff introduced into evidence certified cop-
ies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
of the California Court which were admitted without ob-
jection by defendant (TR. 64). Thereafter, the court gave 
defendant an opportunity of getting into the record such 
additional matters of evidence as he desired (TR. 73-74-75). 
Thereafter, the court, pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties granted the writ of habeas corpus and forthwith 
returned said children to the plaintiff, but ordered, how-
ever, that she not leave the State of Utah until 12 :00 o'clock 
noon, October 16, 1954, and not then if the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah or any justice thereof ordered other-
wise (TR. 52). Thereafter, defendant filed his notice of 
appeal to this court and filed a motion in the Supreme Court 
for an order staying the proceedings in the District Court 
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pending the determination of the appeal. The motion for 
a stay came on for hearing before the Honorable F. Henri 
Henriod, Justice of this court, in his chambers on October 
16, 1954, at which time he entered an order directing the 
plaintiff to immediately return the children to the defen-
dant and prohibiting either party from taking the children 
from the State of Utah pending the determination of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. 1 
THE ONLY JUSTICIABL,E ISSUES EXISTING 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WERE AT THE 
INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF THE DEFEN-
DANT AND BY STIPULATION OF THE PAR-
TIES WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER 
COURT REMOVED TO AND SUBMITTED FOR 
FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE CALI-
FORNIA COURT, WHICH COURT AT ALL 
TIMES HAD AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE 
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND 
THE SUBJECT MATTER. 
POINT NO.2 
THE JURISDICTION OF' THE CALIFORNIA 
COURT HAVING BEEN VOLUNTARILY AND 
PROPERLY INVOKED BY THE PARTIES 
WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER 
COURT, THE CALIFORNIA COURT'S ORDERS 
AND DECREE ARE ENTITLED TO FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT IN THIS STATE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE ONLY JUSTICIABLE ISSUES EXISTING 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WERE AT THE 
INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF THE DEFEN-
DANT AND BY STIPULATION OF THE PAR-
TIES WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER 
COURT REMOVED TO AND SUBMITTED FOR 
FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE CALI-
FORNIA COURT, WHICH COURT AT ALL 
TIMES HAD AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE 
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND 
THE SUBJECT MATTER. 
Plaintiff is in accord with defendant's statement in 
his brief, page 12, "That the best interest and welfare of 
the children is the controlling factor and is the rule adopted 
by this court in child custody cases when not controlled by 
statute." We contend, however, in answer to his question: 
"Has the rule been applied and followed in the instant 
case?" that it has. 
There is no question but that the California court has 
and at all times will continue to have jurisdiction over the 
parties and the subject matter (27 C. J. S. 322 (c) page 
1246, 27 C. J. S. 333 (c) page 1299 ; Sampsell vs. Superior 
Court (Cal.), 197 P. 2d 739). Nor is it disputed that the 
best interest of said children would be served by invoking 
the California court's jurisdiction as evidenced by the 
statement of defendant's counsel made during the course of 
the proceedings held on June 22, 1954, to-wit: "Now, I can 
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see, Your Honor, that the orderly sensible, practical thing 
to do would be for these parties to go down to California 
where the court had jurisdiction of the matrimonial domi-
cile of the parties" ( TR. 33) , and again : "There is an-
other fact, Your Honor, looking at the best interests of the 
children. It isn't to their best interests that a record be 
made that is so fleeting and temporary in this court of the 
kind that will have to be made. It ought to be down there 
in the California court" (TR. 35). 
Because the lower court (TR. 35) and the plaintiff 
( TR. 45) were of the same opinion, the parties entered into 
a stipulation, the effect of which was to submit the justi-
ciable issues existing between the parties to the California 
court for a final determination. The parties having sub-
mitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the California 
court, they are now bound by its order denying the petition 
of defendant to modify the decree of divorce. As we read 
defendant's brief, he does dispute· this contention, but mere-
ly contends that the applicable rule of law in California is: 
"A perfected appeal in an action for the custody of a child 
automatically constitutes a stay of proceedings and pre-
cludes a trial court from interfering with custody as it 
existed at the time of the appeal" (Defendant's Brief, Page 
14). Plaintiff agrees wi_th defendant that the foregoing is 
the rule of law applicable to child custody cases in the State 
of California, but we cannot agree with defendant in his 
application and interpretation of the rule as he would have 
this court apply it to the facts of this case. 
In the more recent case of Ex parte Robelet (Cal.), 
263 P. 2d 486, the wife was granted a final decree of divorce 
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from the father and awarded custody of their two minor 
children, ages 11 and 10. She did not take physical custody 
of the children because of a serious physical and mental 
illness and upon the advice of her physician. While the 
children were in the physical custody of the father, heap-
plied for and obtained an order modifying the custody pro-
visions of the original decree granting to him the physical 
custody of the children with visitation rights granted to the 
mother. Shortly thereafter and while the children were 
with the mother under the visitation provisions of the mod-
ification order, she applied for an order to change the 
custody of the children to herself. Following a hearing on 
her application, the court further modified the custody 
provisions of the· decree and awarded the physical custody. 
of the children to the mother. The father immediately filed 
a notice of appeal and pending said appeal filed a petition 
for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the State of 
California contending that his appeal stayed the last modi-
fication order, and that, therefore, he was entitled to custody 
of the children pending the appeal. The matter vvas re-
ferred to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division One, California,- by the Supreme Court. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rule of law quoted 
by the defendant in his brief (Page 14) and further held: 
"At the present time there is no showing that the children 
may not safely remain with. the father pending the appeal. 
By reason of the foregoing, it is ordered that the children 
be delivered to the petitioner (father), who, pending de-
termination of the appeal, is entitled to the custody pur-
suant to the terms of the Superior Court order of October 
3, 1952," which order was the first modification order 
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granting to him custody of the two minor children. Thus, 
applying the rule of law of ex parte Robelet, supra, plain-
tiff is entitled to the custody of the two minor children 
pending the appeal in California by reason of the terms of 
the final decree of divorce entered by the California court 
on March 9, 1954 (TR. 6), and, therefore, the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, in granting the writ of habeas 
corpus and delivering the physical custody of the children 
to the plaintiff forthwith, gave effect to the stipulation 
and intent of the parties and committed no error in the 
absence of any allegation or evidence offered on behalf of 
the defendant to show that the best interest of the children 
was not thereby served. 
POINT N0.-2 
'fHE JURISDICTION OF THE CALIFORNIA 
COURT HAVING BEEN VOLUNTARILY AND 
PROPERLY INVOKED BY THE PARTIES 
WITH TliE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER 
COURT, THE CALIFORNIA COURT'S ORDERS 
AND DECREE ARE ENTITLED TO FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT IN THIS STATE. 
The parties having rightfully and properly submitted 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the California court, which 
court has and at all times will continue to have jurisdiction 
over the parties and the subject matter, and that court 
having found: 
"8. That the plaintiff, JEANNE ALEXINE 
JENKINS, has recovered from any physical or men-
tal disabilities which may have existed during the 
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period from February, 1953, to July, 1953, that said 
disabilities are not likely to reoccur; that the plain-
tiff is a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody, and control of the minor children, THEO-
DORE SCOTT JENKINS and MIA JENKINS", and 
"9. That THEODORE SCOTT JENKINS and 
MIA JENKINS are of young and tender years, be-
ing approximately 6 and 4 years of age, respectively; 
that it is for the best interests of said minor chil-
dren that they be in the care, custody, and control 
of their natural mother, the plaintiff, JEANNE 
ALEXINE JENKINS", and 
"10. That there has not been any change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification 
of the Interlocutory and Final Decrees of Divorce 
with respect to the care, custody, and control of said 
two minor children", and 
"11. That the minor children, THEODORE 
SCOTT JENKINS and MIA JENKINS, should be 
immediately returned by defendant to the home of 
the plaintiff in San Francisco, California." (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4, Pages 3-4.) 
Its order entered on the 22nd day of September, 1954 (TR. 
19), ordering the defendant to immediately deliver said 
minor children to the home of the plaintiff is entitled to 
full faith and credit in this state in the absence of any facts 
or conditions arising subsequent to the date of the decree 
which would justify a change in the interest of the children 
(Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550). The de-
fendant having been given the opportunity to offer any 
evidence he desired as to why the California court's order 
should not be enforced (TR. 67, 73, 75), and having failed 
to show or allege any change in circumstances since the 
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entry of the California court's order on September 22, 1954, 
the rule of law of SampseU vs. Holt, supra, was binding 
upon the lower court and, therefore, it was not error for 
said court to grant to plaintiff the immediate custody of 
said children. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the appeal of the 
defendant should be forthwith dismissed and the order 
entered by the Honorable F. Henri Henriod, justice of this 
court, be vacated and set aside, and that the defendants be 
ordered to return the custody of said two minor children 
to the plaintiff in conformity with the order of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and the decrees 
and order of the Superior Court of the State of California 
in and for the county of San Diego. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM R. INGEBRETSEN, of 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES 
& HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Plain-
tiff and Respondent. 
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